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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 
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CLAYTON II, BRUCE U. CLAYTON, 
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Plaintiffs, 
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COWAN, Trustees, 
Defendants. 
-vs-
GERALDINE V. GRIFFITHS, 
Cross-Plaintiff, 
-vs-
CALVIN W. CLAYTON, SR., Trustee, 
CALVIN W. CLAYTON, SR., C. 
COMSTOCK CLAYTON II, BRUCE U. 
CLAYTON and CALVIN W, CLAYTON, JR. 
Cross-Defendants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
CALVIN A. BEHLE, 
EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE 
OF C. COMSTOCK CLAYTON, 
DECEASED. 
CASE NO. 14662 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a case in equity whereby the Plaintiffs seek to 
establish the validity of a certain trust instrument executed by 
C. Comstock Clayton in 19 63 and to impress a constructive trust 
upon 125 shares of Clayton-Macfarlane Company stock. 
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The defendants are first, the Executor of the Estate 
of C. Comstock Clayton who holds 25 shares of the 12 5 shares in 
dispute as part of undistributed residue of Mr. Clayton's estate 
and secondly, the Trustees of the C. Comstock Clayton Foundation 
which in 1969 received as a gift from Mr. Clayton 100 shares of 
the disputed stock, and which as residuary beneficiary under 
Mr. Clayton's Will would receive the other 25 shares of disputed 
stock subject to this litigation. 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE 3EL0W 
The court held that the trust executed by C. Comstock 
Clayton in 19 63 was a valid irrevocable trust and that the 
beneficiaries of said trust are entitled to receive the 12 5 shares 
of stock currently held by the Trustees of the C. Comstock Clayton 
Foundation and/or the Executor of the C. Comstock Clayton Estate. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The defendants herein named seek to have the judgment of 
the lower court set aside on the basis that the 196 3 Trust had 
been properly terminated, and under the facts the equitable relief 
sought by plaintiffs should be denied. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
C. Comstock Clayton, who was born and died a resident of • 
Utah, owned one-half or 125 shares of all of the stock of the 
Clayton-Macfarlane Company, a Utah corporation, whose principal 
asset was and still is a 7,461 acre ranch in East Canyon, Utah. 
(F.4 R.973). C. Comstock Clayton left as heirs one son, Calvin 
-2-
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Whitney Clayton, Sr., three grandsons, Charles Comstock Clayton, 
Bruce U. Clayton and Calvin Whitney Clayton, Jr., who are all 
sons of Calvin Whitney Clayton, Sr.; one granddaughter, Geraldine 
V. Griffiths (formerly Geraldine Robertson), the daughter of a 
deceased daughter of C. Comstock Clayton. Plaintiff, Winifred 
U. Clayton, is the estranged wife of Calvin W. Clayton, Sr. 
THE CLAYTON FAMILY TRUST AND ITS REVOCATION 
On October 22, 1963, C. Comstock Clayton as Donor and Co-
trustee and Calvin W. Clayton, Sr., his only son, as co-trustee 
executed an instrument, entitled the CLAYTON FAMILY TRUST (Exhibit 
1 below), which was drafted by Mario Ciullo, a Boston, Massachusetts 
attorney employed by both Messrs. Clayton and the Clayton Securities 
Company. C. Comstock Clayton was referred to in said Trust as a 
resident of the State of Utah. On November 1, 1963, pursuant to 
a letter from Mr. Mario Ciullo dated October 23, 1963 (Exhibit 2 
below), the 125 shares of Clayton-Macfarlane Company stock owned 
by C. Comstock Clayton were transferred in Utah by Grant Macfarlane, 
the president and transfer agent of said company and Mr. Clayton's 
Utah attorney, to fund the Clayton Family Trust,and a new Certifi-
cate Number 26 (Exhibit 18 below) representing 125 shares and in 
the name of the Clayton Family Trust was returned by Macfarlane to 
Mr. Ciullo. ' 
The beneficiaries of the Clayton Family Trust were C. Comstock 
Clayton for life, then his son Calvin W. Clayton, Sr. for life, 
and then the issue of Calvin W. Clayton, Sr. This Trust was devoid 
-3-
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of any language as to its revocability or irrevocability. It 
did, however, contain language which would allow the trustee to 
invade the principal to provide for the health, maintenance or 
comfort of the two life beneficiaries. (Exhibit 1 below). 
On or about May 16, 1967, pursuant to a request by C. 
Comstock Clayton that Stock Certificate Number 26, of the Clayton-
Macfarlane Company be transferred to him personally, Grant Macfarlane 
informed Mr. Clayton that he would transfer said stock if Calvin, 
the other co-trustee, would join in the assignment of Certificate 
Number 26. (Ab. 23, R. 138). Pursuant to such indication, a stock 
power appointing Grant Macfarlane attorney for the purpose of 
transferring said stock on the books of the Clayton-Mcfarlane 
company was executed by C. Comstock Clayton and Calvin W. Clayton 
on May 16, 1967 (Exhibit 19 below). 
On June 9, 1967, Stock Certificate Number 26 was cancelled 
by Grant Macfarlane and Stock Certificate Number 39 (Exhibit 20 
below) was issued and delivered to C. Comstock Clayton individually. 
(F. 16 R. 975). 
CLAYTON BENEFICIARY VOTING TRUST 
3y letter to C. Comstock Clayton in Salt Lake City, Utah 
dated July 12, 1967, (Exhibit 3 below), Mario Ciullo sent Mr. Clayton 
an instrument prepared by Mr. Ciullo (Ab. 3, Tr. 17) called the 
CLAYTON BENEFICIARY VOTING TRUST. In the July 12, 1967 letter, 
Mr. Ciullo asked Mr. Clayton to execute the trust before a Utah 
notary public. Also enclosed with this letter was Stock Certifi-
-4-
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cate Number 39 for 12 5 shares of Clayton-Macfarlane Company stock 
(Exhibit 20 below). Mr. Ciullo asked that Mr. Clayton endorse 
and deliver this Stock Certificate to Grant Macfarlane along with 
the Trust Instrument for transfer to the trust. In this letter, 
Mr. Ciullo further advised Comstock Clayton to keep the Trust 
Certificate in Utah "because of possible legal complications. . .in 
Massachusetts,'1 but asked for a letter from Mr. Macfarlane indi-
cating that the transfer to the Trust had been made. Mo such 
letter was ever received by Mr. Ciullo. (Ab. 62 Tr. 407, 408). 
On July 20, 1967, Stock Certificate Number 39 in the name of 
C. Comstock Clayton individually was delivered to Grant Macfarlane 
with an endorsement by Comstock Clayton. (F. 17 R. 975) . 
The 125 shares of stock were then issued as Certificate Number 40 
in the name of the Clayton Beneficiary Voting Trust and delivered to 
Mr. Clayton. (F. 17 R. 975; Ab. 28 R. 162). On August 29, 1967, 
C. Comstock Clayton as Donor and co-trustee executed and acknowledged 
the Clayton Beneficiary Voting Trust. (F. 18 R. 975). The benefici-
aries of this trust were to be C. Comstock Clayton for life; then 
one-fifth of the remainder as follows: 
1. Calvin W. Clayton, Sr. and Winifred U. Clayton 
jointly and with right of survivorship. 
2. Comstock Clayton II. 
3. Bruce U. Clayton 
4. Calvin W. Clayton, Jr. 
5. Geraldine V. Robertson (now Geraldine V. Griffiths) 
-5-
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This trust, like the Clayton Family Trustf provided for the 
invasion of the principal for the health, maintenance, or comfort 
of C. Comstock Clayton during his life if in the discretion of 
the trustees it was necessary. (Exhibit 4 below). But again, 
no express power to revoke was included. 
THE C. COMSTOCK CLAYTON TRUST 
Shortly before the execution of the Clayton Beneficiary 
Voting Trust, on June 18, 1967, C. Comstock Clayton executed a 
third trust denominated the C. COMSTOCK CLAYTON TRUST. (Exhibit 6 
below). This Trust was to be funded by $250,000 in cash and 
securities and C. Comstock Clayton was Donor and co-trustee with 
Mario Ciullo as co-trustee. The beneficiaries under this Trust 
were to be C. Comstock Clayton for his life; then Calvin W. Clayton, 
Sr. and his wife, Winifred U. Clayton, for life; and then the 
issue of Calvin W. Clayton, Sr. were to receive the income in per 
stirpes shares until the youngest reached or would have reached 
25 years of age at which time all principal and income would be 
divided and distributed in per stirpes shares. (Exhibit 6 below). 
Two years later by letter of May 20, 1969 to Mario Ciullo, 
C. Comstock Clayton wrote that said C. Comstock Clayton Trust had 
never been activated because his granddaughter (cross-plaintiff 
Geraldine V. Robertson (now Griffiths)) had not been included as 
a beneficiary. He further indicated his willingness to execute 
and activate said trust if it was revised to include his grand-
daughter and her issue as beneficiaries and to have as the res the 
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proceeds of a $250,000 subordinated loan made to Clayton Securi-
ties Company by C. Comstock Clayton• (Exhibit 10 below). Again, 
Ciullo included no express power to revoke in the drafts of this 
Trust. 
THE C. COMSTOCK CLAYTON FOUNDATION 
On June 1, 1968 C. Comstock Clayton, as Donor, and Calvin 
A. Behle, T. Bowring Woodbury and Ralph D. Cowan, as Trustees, 
executed a Trust Agreement establishing THE C. COMSTOCK CLAYTON 
FOUNDATION. (F.19 R.975). The purpose of said Trust is to benefit 
charitable, religious, scientific, literary or educational activi-
ties, and it has been used since its establishment primarily to 
support the Utah Symphony Orchestra. On or about February 5, 19 69, 
Comstock Clayton alone endorsed Stock Certificate Number 40 which 
had been issued in the name of the Clayton Beneficiary Voting 
Trust, and asked Grant Macfarlane to cancel said certificate and 
issue a new certificate in his name individually. (F.20 R.975; 
Ab.28 R.164). While Mr. Macfarlane initially objected on the basis 
that Calvin W. Clayton, Sr. had not endorsed the certificate, upon 
Mr. Clayton's statement that the certificate had never been deliv-
ered to the Clayton Beneficiary Voting Trust and that the stock 
was his alone and he had the right to have it transferred, 
Mr. Macfarlane cancelled Stock Certificate Number 40 and issued 
and delivered Stock Certificate Number 41 (Exhibit 22 below) for 
125 shares of Clayton-Macfarlane Company stock to C. Comstock 
Clayton individually (Ab.25 R.149). 
On September 17, 19 69 C. Comstock Clayton presented Stock 
Certificate Number 41 for cancellation to Vicci Eckhart, Grant 
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Macfarlane's secretary, who, pursuant to Mr. Macfarlanefs instruc-
tions cancelled Certificate Number 41 and issued Certificate Number 
4 2 for 25 shares of Clayton-Macfarlane Company stock to C. Comstock 
Clayton individually (Exhibit 34 below) and Certificate Number 43 
for 100 shares of said stock to the C. Comstock Clayton Foundation. 
The original Certificate Number 4 3 (Exhibit 23 below) was erroneously 
issued to the Clayton Beneficiary Voting Trust and was cancelled by 
Miss Eckhart at that same time in favor of another Certificate 
Number 43 to the Foundation. (Exhibit 25 below; Ab.55-57 R.359-369.) 
MR. CLAYTON'S LAST WILL 
C. Comstock Clayton executed his Last Will and Testament on 
September 30, 1969. (Exhibit 29 below.) The following were named 
as beneficiaries in the following amounts or the equivalent under 
said Will: 
1. Mabel Clayton (wife) $50,000 
2. Geraldine V. Robertson (granddaughter) all personal 
property + $25,000 
3. Utah Symphony 10,000 
4. Irving E. Clayton (brother) 10,000 
5. Rae K. Jeppson (sister-in-law) 10,000 
6. Calvin Whitney Clayton, Sr. (son) 80,614 
7. Winifred U. Clayton (daughter-in-law) 10,000 
8. Charles Comstock Clayton II (grandson) 25,000 
9. Bruce Underwood Clayton (grandson) 25,000 
10. Calvin Whitney Clayton, Jr. (grandson) 25,000 
11. Mary Sanford McKahan 5,000 
12. Shirley Elizabeth Horsley Bennetts 10,000 
13. Kathryn V. McGoldrick 5,000 
14. C. Comstock Clayton Foundation residue 
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By codicil dated December 31, 1970, Mr. Clayton added Effie Kelsey 
as a beneficiary in the amount of $5,000. (Exhibit 35 below.) 
On October 21, 19 69 C. Comstock Clayton announced to the 
Board of Trustees of the C. Comstock Clayton Foundation his donation 
of 10 0 shares of Clayton-Macfarlane Company stock to the Foundation. 
(Exhibit 30 below.) 
On either October 7 or 13, 1969, the C. Comstock Clayton 
Trust was executed by C. Comstock Clayton as Donor and co-trustee 
and by Mario Ciullo as co-trustee. (Exhibits 7 and 8 below.) As 
redrafted, the beneficiaries of the Trust were to be C. Comstock 
Clayton for life; then Calvin W. Clayton and Geraldine V. Robertson 
(now Griffiths) in equal shares for life; at the death of Calvin W. 
Clayton to Winifred U. Clayton, his wife, for life; at the death of 
the survivor of Calvin W. Clayton or Winifred U. Clayton to the issue 
of Calvin W. Clayton per stirpes; at the death of Geraldine V. 
Robertson to her issue per stirpes. This Trust was to be funded by 
$360,000 in promissory notes of the Clayton Securities Corporation 
under a subordinated capital loan agreement with C. Comstock Clayton 
and was eventually so funded in December of 1970 (Ab. 6 0 R. 390). 
On December 7, 19 70 Mario Ciullo telephoned Calvin A. Behle 
and Grant Macfarlane indicating that the shares of Clayton-Macfarlane 
Company stock in dispute here were supposed to be held by a Mass-
achusetts trust. (Ab.50 R.325.) This was the first indication 
Mr. Behle had of any Massachusetts trusts. (Ab.49 R.317.) In 
checking with C. Comstock Clayton on December 30, 19 70, Mr. Behle 
was informed by Mr. Clayton that while there had been a trust in 
- Q -
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Massachusetts, he had never activated it. Mr. Macfarlane was 
likewise so informed. (Ab.28 R.164). 
C. Comstock Clayton died on February 14, 1971 of cerebral 
arteriosclerosis and thrombosis. (Exhibit 16 below.) 
On May 28, 1971 a creditor's claim for 125 shares of 
Clayton-Macfarlane Company stock was filed on behalf of the six 
beneficiaries of The Clayton Beneficiary Voting Trust only, by 
Calvin W. Clayton as surviving co-trustee, with Appellant as Executor 
appointed by the Probate Division of the District Court of Salt 
Lake County, Utah. (Exhibit 32 below.) Said claim was denied by 
the Executor of C. Comstock Clayton's estate on June 9, 19 71. 
On December 23, 19 71, suit was filed in the District Court 
of Salt Lake County by Calvin W. Clayton, Sr., Trustee, and Calvin 
W. Clayton, Sr., Winifred U. Clayton, C. Comstock.Clayton II, 
Bruce U. Clayton, Calvin W. Clayton, Jr. and Geraldine V. Griffiths 
as plaintiffs, who were the beneficiaries of the 1967 Trust, to 
have the Court declare that Calvin A. Behle, as Executor of the 
Estate of C. Comstock Clayton and Calvin A. Behle, T. Bowring Wood-
bury and Ralph D. Cowan as Trustees of the C. Comstock Clayton 
Foudation held 125 shares of Clayton-Macfarlane Company stock for 
the benefit of the Clayton Family Trust or the Clayton Beneficiary 
Voting Trust and to have said defendants transfer said stock to 
Calvin W. Clayton, Sr. as surviving trustee of both trusts. (R.442.) 
For ready reference, a concise table of key dates and 
events as well as a table indicating the history of the shares of 
Clayton-Macfarlane Company stock here in question are included as 
Exhibits A and B. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. THE COURT BELOW FAILED TO CONSIDER THE EQUITABLE DEFENSES 
RAISED 3Y APPELLANT, CALVIN A. BEHLE, EXECUTOR. 
A. Clean Hands 
B. Laches 
II. THE ACTIONS OF PLAINTIFFS WOULD MAKE IT INEQUITABLE TO 
GRANT THEM RELIEF AND THE DOCTRINE OF LACHES SHOULD BE 
APPLIED TO DENY THEIR CLAIMS. 
III. CALVIN AND HIS SONS SHOULD HAVE FILED A PROPER CLAIM WITH 
THE EXECUTOR UNDER THE 1963 RANCH TRUST, AS THEY DID 
TOGETHER WITH THEIR MOTHER AND COUSIN UNDER THE 19 67 
RANCH TRUST. 
IV. PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO MEET AND CARRY THEIR BURDEN OF PROOF. 
V. IN ALL REMAINING ASPECTS OF THIS APPEAL, THE APPELLANT, 
EXECUTOR ADOPTS THE POINTS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE APPELLANT 
FOUNDATION IN THIS PLEA BEFORE EQUITY TO UPSET AT THE 
BEHEST OF DECEDENT'S MASSACHUSETTS FAMILY THE TRUST FOR 
THE BENEFIT OF THE PEOPLE OF UTAH WHICH MR. C. COMSTOCK CLAYTON 
UNEQUIVOCALLY DESIRED TO IMPLEMENT. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE COURT BELOW FAILED TO CONSIDER THE 
EQUITABLE DEFENSES RAISED BY APPELLANT, 
CALVIN A. BEHLE, EXECUTOR 
The court below, even though the question was presented 
in the context of a motion for a jury trial and objections thereto, 
failed to make a definitive ruling as to whether this action was 
one in equity or in law. However, the fact that this is an action 
in equity clearly appears on the face of the original complaint 
filed by the six original plaintiffs who ask for declaratory relief 
-11-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to have the defendant-Executor and the defendants-Trustees hold 
the shares of Clayton-Macfarlane Company stock, currently held by 
them, as trustees for plaintiffs. An action for declaratory relief 
is an equitable action. McDonald v. Midland Mining Co., 293 P.2d 
911 (D.C.App. Cal. 1965). And as stated in Tibbitts v. Fife, 328 
P.2d 212, 214 (D.C.App. Cal. 1958), "Equity retains exclusive 
jurisdiction of actions to establish and enforce trusts." 
Since this is so clearly an action in equity, there can be 
no doubt about the fact that all of the long established maxims 
of equity apply to it. Two of said maxims are of particular impor-
tance in this case. The first has been stated as "He who comes 
into equity must come with clean hands." The second, which is 
sometimes said to include the first, has been stated as "Equity 
aids the vigilant, not those who sleep on their rights," and is 
commonly known as the doctrine of "laches." 
There can be little doubt that the judge below failed to 
consider these defenses. In a Motion to Amend Defendant's Answer, 
filed on March 26, 197 6, defendants asked that they be allowed to 
amend the pleadings, and particularly their Answer, to conform to 
the evidence introduced at trial, by including the equitable 
defenses of "lack of clean hands" and "laches." The judge denied 
said motion stating that it had not been timely filed. (R. 968, 970). 
This alone contravenes the law as set forth in Rule 15(b), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, which states that a motion to amend the 
pleadings to conform to the evidence "...may be made upon motion 
of any party at any time, even after judgment...." 
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Rule 8(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, requires that 
certain defenses including "laches" be pleaded as an affirmative 
defense but the defense of "unclean hands" is not included in 
said rule. However, Rule 8(c) is not independent of the other 
Rules of Civil Procedure and must not be applied to defeat their 
fundamental purpose. Thus, the Supreme Court of Utah has said, 
"It is true, as plaintiff insists, that Rule 8(c) 
U.R.C.P., requires that affirmative defenses be 
pleaded. It is a good rule whose purpose is to 
have the issues to be tried clearly framed. But 
it is not the only rule in the book of Rules of 
Civil Procedure. They must all be looked to in 
the light of their even more fundamental purpose 
of liberalizing both pleading and procedure to 
the end that the parties are afforded the privil-
ege of presenting whatever legitimate contentions 
they have pertaining to their dispute. What they 
are entitled to is notice of the issues raised 
and an opportunity to meet them. When this is 
accomplished, that is all that is required." 
Cheney v. Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 205, 381 P,2d 
86, 91 (1963). 
That plaintiffs had notice of the issues of laches and unclean 
hands cannot be doubted. Plaintiffs were initially put on notice 
verbally at a hearing held before the court on October 30, 1975 
when the judge was considering a request for a jury trial and 
whether or not this case was a case in equity. Plaintiffs were 
further and more clearly advised of these particular issues during 
the trial of this action when it became apparent to all that 
Calvin W. Clayton, Sr. had engaged in the actions, described here-
after, which give rise to these equitable defenses. And, if any 
doubt still existed in the minds of plaintiffs as to the reliance 
of defendants upon these equitable defenses, defendants1 Trial Brief, 
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filed pursuant to the order of the court at the conclusion of 
the trial of this matter, would have extinguished any doubt. In 
Point IV of said Brief, entitled "Plaintiffs1 Claimed Relief is 
Inequitable," plaintiffs are put on notice of defendants1 reliance 
upon equitable defenses, particularly that of the "clean hands 
doctrine." Thus, it is clear that plaintiffs were on notice and 
certainly had the opportunity at trial as well as in subsequent 
proceedings to meet these issues, which is all that is required 
under the law* 
A. Clean Hands 
The maxim that "He who comes into equity must come with 
clean hands" is a basic and fundamental precept of equity juris-
prudence- Park v. Jameson, 12 Utah 2d 141, 364 P.2d 1 (1961); 
27 AmJur 2d, Equity, §136, p.666; 4 A.L.R. 44; 30 C.J.S., Equity, 
§93, p.1008. Stated simply it requires that anyone seeking enforce-
ment of any claim in equity must come to the bar of the court of 
equity without inequitable conduct on his part. Otherwise the 
court will refuse to lend its aid to his claim. This maxim has 
been more specifically defined as follows: 
"The meaning of the maxim is that a party to 
a suit in equity, in order to obtain the relief 
sought, must not have been guilty of reprehensible 
conduct directly connected with the matter in 
controversy, and that any litigant who is at 
fault in this respect will not receive the aid of > 
a court of equity in the protection of any rights 
which he may claim relating to the matter of the 
suit." 4 ALR 44, 47. 
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"It means that whenever a party who seeks to 
set the judicial machinery in motion and obtain 
some equity remedy has violated conscience or 
good faith, or other equitable principle in his 
prior conduct with reference to the subject in 
issue, the doors of equity will be shut against 
him notwithstanding the defendant's conduct has 
been such that in the absence of circumstances 
supporting the application of the maxim, equity 
might have awarded relief." 2 7 AmJur 2d, Equity, 
§137, p.670. 
"It means that equity refuses to lend its aid in 
any manner to one seeking its active interposition 
who has been guilty of unlawful or inequitable 
conduct in the matter with relation to which he 
seeks relief." 30 C.J.S. Equity, §93, p.1009. 
Case law in virtually all jurisdictions reflects similar definitions 
of the maxim, and the Utah Supreme Court has said, "A court of 
equity is a court of conscience, and anyone appealing to or asking 
the aid of such court should come into it with clean hands and be 
willing to do equity." Shell Oil Co., v. Steffler, 87 Utah 176 
48 P.2d 503, 509 (1935); Swanson v. Sims, 51 Utah 485, 496, 170 
P.2d 774 (1918). 
As indicated above, this is an equitable action since the 
plaintiffs seek declaratory relief by asking the court to require 
the defendants to hold certain property in trust for them. Thus, 
the clean hands doctrine, a fundamental maxim in equity, should 
have been considered by the Court. 
While this maxim was not specifically raised as a defense 
in the defendants1 Answer to plaintiffs1 complaint, it should 
nevertheless have been considered by the judge below since, as 
indicated above, both the judge and the plaintiffs had adequate 
notice of defendants1 reliance upon said defense and its application 
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to this case. Generally, it has been said that the "clean hands" 
maxim may be invoked by a party who has not pleaded it. 27 Am Jur 
2d, Equity, §136, p.668; Dickerson v. Murfield, 147 P.2d 194 
(S.Ct. Ore. 1944). As stated in 4 A.L.R. 44, 47: 
"The maxim need not be pleaded, for when the 
evidence discloses the unconscionable character 
of a transaction, the court, whether the maxim 
is pleaded or not, will of its own motion apply 
the principle involved therein." 
In other words, the maxim is applied to protect the public and 
the integrity of the court, 30 C.J.S. Equity, §9 3 p.1012, and where 
the facts presented to a Court of equity raise the question of a 
plaintifffs own misconduct in appearing to invoke the court's aid, 
the court of its own motion must consider the facts of plaintiff's 
case with regard to the cleanliness of his hands. Or, as stated 
in 30 C.J.S., Equity, §93, p.1013: 
"Whether parties are within the application 
of the maxim is primarily a question of fact, 
and the court, on any suggestion that a 
plaintiff has not acted in good faith concern-
ing matters on which he bases his suit, must 
inquire into the facts in that respect." 
The facts, which form the background of this action, as they 
developed in discovery and at the trial, demonstrate the obvious 
reasons for which the clean hands doctrine should be applied to 
reject plaintiffs' claim. The record clearly reflects that in 1963 
Calvin W. Clayton, Sr. entered into a trust agreement as co-trustee 
with his father, C. Cornstock Clayton. This trust was funded by the 
125 shares of Clayton-MacFarlane Company stock here in question 
which were owned by C. Comstock Clayton and donated by him to the 
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Trust. Four of the plaintiffs claim, as part of their action 
herein, that said trust was irrevocable since no express words 
of revocation were included* They further assert that the res 
of said Trust was converted by C. Comstock Clayton in breach of 
his fiduciary duties as trustee. Defendant Behle, as Executor, 
specifically denies that said res was convereted by C. Comstock 
Clayton, in breach of his fiduciary duties, and adopts the brief 
of Appellant Foundations trustees with respect to revocability. 
Further, it is clear that decedent's son, Calvin W. Clayton, Sr. 
knew of the transfer of said res to C. Comstock Clayton, his father, 
and in fact actively participated in the transfer of the res as 
well as in setting up the Clayton Beneficiary Voting trust which 
he knew was at one time intended to be funded by the same res. 
This is affirmed by the testimony of Calvin W. Clayton, (Ab. 38 
R. 239) and also by the fact that he, along with all five of the 
other plaintiffs herein, believed that the 1963 Clayton Family 
Trust had been revoked and therefore filed a creditor's claim with 
appellant Executor in reliance only on the 1967 Clayton Beneficiary 
Voting Trust. (Exhibit 32 below.) 
Plaintiff, Calvin Sr., along with the other plaintiffs in 
this action, have asserted, in essence, that the revocation of the 
1963 Trust was unlawful since the law of Massachusetts does not 
allow revocation of a trust where no specific language reserves 
said power. If this is the law of Massachusetts, which appellant 
Executor specifically denies, Calvin Sr. actively participated in 
an unlawful act with respect to said res in endorsing Certificate 
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Number 26 for transfer tc C. Comstock Clayton and in acting as 
a trustee for the Clayton Beneficiary Voting Trust which was, as 
Calvin knew, to be funded by the same res. 
Calvin's conduct clearly flies in the face of the following 
definition from 27 Am Jur 2d, Equity, §137, p.669: 
"
!Clean hands1 is a legal euphemism which 
refers to the acceptability, cleanliness, 
and decency of the claim put forth." 
His conduct more closely relates to this definition from the same 
source: 
"Within the purview of the maxim, the hands 
of the litigant are rendered unclean by conduct 
which is 'condemned and pronounced wrongful 
by honest and fair minded men.'" 27 Am Jur 
2d, Equity, §138, p.672. 
and was described as follows in Seal v. Seal, 212 Kan. 55, 510 
p.2d 167, 173 (Kan. 1973): 
"That status (of having unclean hands) is 
acquired by 'willful conduct which is 
fraudulent, illegal, or unconscionable." 
(Parentheses and emphasis ours). 
Furthermore, that the court below should have denied relief to 
Calvin, Sr. based on his conduct is supported by the following: 
"Relief will be denied where it appears that 
the right upon which the complainant relies 
has grown out of a wrong, a breach of duty, 
or a violation of law.... Furthermore, a 
party will not be relieved from the consequences 
of his own fraud or wrong or be given the aid 
of equity to right his own wrong." (Emphasis added) 
27 Am Jur 2d, Equity, §138, pp.672, 674. 
"'Any really unconscientious conduct connected 
with the controversy, to which he is a party, 
will repel him from the forum whose very founda-
tion is good conscience.1 1 Pomeroy, Equity 
Jurisprudence §404. *** But where conduct, 
in addition to being unconscionable, is also 
illegal, a court of equity will, of course, 
refuse its aid to any person or persons guilty 
thereof." 4 A.L.R. 63 (Emphasis ours). 
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Or, as stated in Weegham v. Killefer, 215 Fed. 171 (1914): 
"Under this maxim any willful act in regard to 
the matter in litigation which would be condemned 
and pronounced wrongful by honest and fairminded 
men will be sufficient to make the hands of the 
applicant unclean. Both courts and text writers 
have repeatedly spoken upon this subject in no 
uncertain language.... He who has acted in bad 
faith, resorted to trickery and deception, or 
been guilty of fraud, injustice, or unfairness, 
will appeal in vain to a court of conscience, 
even though in his wrongdoings he may have kept 
himself strictly 'within the law1." 
While Calvin W. Clayton, Sr.'s conduct is obviously of such 
a nature as to preclude him from relief in equity, his conduct and 
its unconscionability are compounded by the involvement and activities 
of Mario Ciullo with respect to said trusts. Mr. Ciullo admits that 
he is personally interested in the outcome of this action. (Ab.ll 
R.64). Mr. Ciullo further testified at trial that he considered 
himself an expert in the law of trusts in Massachusetts and was 
accepted by the court below as just such an expert. (Ab5R.28). 
It is clear from the record that Mr. Ciullo was the scrivener 
of several trusts involving C. Comstcck Clayton as donor and trustee 
and Calvin W. Clayton, Sr. or himself as co-trustee, including the 
Clayton Family Trust, the Clayton Beneficiary Voting Trust, and 
the C. Cornstock Clayton Trust. Thus, Ciullo, the trust expert, 
participated in what has been described by the plaintiffs as the 
conversion of the trust res from the Clayton Family Trust. His 
only reservation in doing so, apparently was his statement to 
C. Cornstock Clayton, as part of his letter outlining what needed 
to be done to activate the Clayton Beneficiary Voting Trust and 
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to transfer the stock in said Trust, that the trust certificate 
should be kept in Utah because of "possible legal complications11 
in Massachusetts. The fact that Mr. Ciullo failed clearly to 
inform his client, Mr. Clayton, that such a transfer was, as he 
and the plaintiffs now assert, against the law, and the fact 
that Ciullo actively participated in preparing the documents 
which led to what plaintiffs call Mr. Clayton's conversion, all 
indicate that other unclean hands besides Calvin W. Clayton, Sr.'s 
were at work. 
The record makes it clear that the other beneficiaries 
under the 1963 Clayton Family Trust did not directly participate 
in the revocation of or expressly waive their interests in the 
196 3 Trust. However, such specific participation or waiver is 
not always a requirement to show a lack of clean hands on the 
part of such beneficiaries particularly where they by virtue of 
their family relationship are in privity with their father as a 
beneficiary. Thus, it has been said: 
"It has been pronounced that where a plaintiff 
comes into equity for relief, he and those in 
privity with him must be free of any inequitable 
conduct relative to the controversy. It has been 
held that although all members of a group suing 
as plaintiffs are not guilty of unconscionable 
conduct, they cannot claim the benefit of a fraud 
perpetrated by one or two of their number. If 
the maxim is applicable to the conduct of the 
individual, relief will be denied to his heirs 
or personal representative." 27 Am Jur 2d, 
Equity, §136, p.667. 
The conclusion to be drawn with respect to the application 
of the "clean hands" doctrine to the fact of this case is that 
Calvin W. Clayton, Sr., aided by an attorney who served both himself 
and his father and who still serves Calvin, participated in what 
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Calvin himself has described as a wrongful and illegal conversion 
of the 125 shares of stock in question here. In spite of his 
participation in these actions, he now comes to a court of equity 
seeking to avoid the consequences of his illegal conduct and to 
take advantage of a trust which he helped to revoke. To allow his 
claim would be unconscionable and in derogation of the court's 
duty to avoid aiding a wrongdoer. At the very least the court 
below should have denied any claim by Calvin W. Clayton, Sr. to 
the stock in question here. However, the taint of Calvin's unclean 
hands likewise appears on the hands of his sons, the other 
beneficiaries under the 1963 Trust. Calvin, who was clearly in 
privity with them and who might be described as their agent 
or guardian, through his partnership in what all plaintiffs claim 
was wrongful and illegal conduct, makes it unconscionable for 
them now to claim the benefit of the 1963 Trust. 
B. Laches. 
The doctrine of laches has been defined in various ways 
including the following: 
"Laches is a purely equitable doctrine which is 
frequently tented the 'doctrine of stale demand.' 
The doctrine of laches may be defined generally 
as a rule of equity by which equitable relief 
is denied to one who has been guilty of unconscion-
able delay, as shown by surrounding facts and cir-
cumstances, in seeking relief. 'Laches' has been 
defined as such neglect or omission to assert a 
right, taken in conjunction with lapse of time 
and other circumstances causing prejudice to an 
adverse party, as will operate in a bar in equity." 
27 Am Jur 2d, Equity, §152, p.687. 
As indicated by this quotation, laches is an equitable 
doctrine. While equity courts had no specific statute of limita-
tions because such were statutory only, they frequently relied 
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upon the doctrine of laches to refuse relief where there had 
been an unreasonable and unexplained delay in prosecuting a 
claim. Equity/ George L. Clark, 1954. Courts of equity still 
apply the doctrine of laches where warranted. Thus, the United 
States Supreme Court has said: 
"...there is a defense peculiar to courts of 
equity founded on lapse of time and the stale-
ness of the claim, where no statute of limitations 
governs the case. In such cases, courts of equity 
act upon their own inherent doctrine of discour-
aging, fcr the peace of society, antiquated demands, 
refuse to interfere where there has been gross 
laches in prosecuting the claim, or long acqui-
escense in the assertion of adverse rights." 
Badger v. Badger, 2 Wall. 87, 94, 17 L.Ed 836 
(1864). 
As earlier indicated, the doctrine of laches is closely 
akin to and based upon maxims of equity similar to those supporting 
the "clean hands" doctrine. Thus, it has been said: 
"Laches is founded principally upon the equitable 
maxims, fhe who seeks equity must do equity,1 
'he who comes into equity must come with clean 
hands,' and 'equity aids the vigilant, not those 
who sleep on their rights.' The basis of the 
doctrine of laches is said to be public policy, 
which requires, for the peace of society, the 
discouragement of stale demands." 27 Am Jur 2d, 
Equity, §153, p.689. 
As a general rule it may be said that the beneficiary of 
a trust may be precluded from recovery in any action for relief 
based upon the trust of which he is a beneficiary where all of 
the elements supporting the doctrine of laches appear. Thus, it 
has been said: 
"Laches of the beneficiary. A beneficiary may be 
barred by his laches from holding the trustee 
liable for a breach of trust. He is so barred if 
he fails to sue the trustee for the breach of trust 
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for so long a time and under such circumstances 
that it would be inequitable to permit him to hold 
the trustee liable. Among the circumstances which 
are of importance are the length of time during 
which the beneficiary has delayed in bringing a 
proceeding against the trustee; the change of cir-
cumstances, if any, between the commission of the 
breach of trust and the bringing of the proceeding, 
such as the death of witnesses or parties, or a 
change of position by the trustees. The notion 
of the barring of suit because of laches is the 
general idea that it is in accordance with public 
policy that suits should be brought with reasonable 
promptness. There is also the idea that after the 
lapse of a long period of time, it is difficult to 
ascertain the truth. There is also the idea of 
hardship to the defendant in pressing stale claims 
against him, although the hardship to him may be 
outweighed by the hardship to the plaintiff in 
denying him redress." Scott on Trusts, §219, p.1755. 
See also, Restatement 2d, Trusts, §219, p.511; Lulay 
v. Lulay, 429 P.2d 802, (S.Ct.Ore. 1967). 
Time is an important factor to consider in determining 
whether laches applies to a particular case. Thus, it has been 
said, "lapse of time is an important, indeed, an essential element 
of laches." 30A C.J.S., Equity, §116, p.45. However, time alone 
is not the only factor which is important to the doctrine of laches. 
Unlike statutes of limitations which are triggered by the passage 
of time alone, laches requires more. As stated in 27 Am Jur 2d, 
Equity, §163, p.703: 
"Laches is not, as is a statutory period of 
limitations, a mere matter of elapsed time, 
but is principally a question of the inequity 
of permitting the claim to be enforced—an 
inequity founded upon some change in the 
conditions or relations of the property or 
the parties." 
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II. 
THE ACTIONS OF PLAINTIFFS WOULD MAKE 
IT INEQUITABLE TO GRANT THEM RELIEF 
AND THE DOCTRINE OF LACHES SHOULD BE 
APPLIED TO DENY THEIR CLAIMS 
There can be no doubt that the doctrine of laches should 
be applied in this case to preclude plaintiffs1 recovery since 
the two elements required to invoke laches are present. First, 
there has been an extended period of time between the time at 
which the cause of action arose and the time when plaintiffs 
brought this action. Second, other factors clearly indicate that 
recovery by plaintiffs, at this late date, would produce inequit-
able results. 
In a case similar in many respects to the one at issue 
here, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed a 
demurrer based upon laches which was granted by a lower court 
against a petitioner who alleged an oral trust and sought the 
proceeds thereof. The petitionees deceased uncle was said to 
have received an assignment of property to secure a $5,000 debt 
owed him by his nephew. The uncle received a large excess over 
and above the $5,0 00 and, though requested by the plaintiff to 
make an accounting, the uncle refused to do so and said he would 
hold the excess in trust for petitioner's wife and child. The 
petitioner alleged that his failure to file any cause of action 
was due to his subserviency to his uncle and his reliance upon 
his uncle's promise to hold the property for petitioner's wife 
and child. The Court cited the long delay and the death of the 
trustee "whose testimony must have been material" and said: 
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"But where the trustee has repudiated his 
obligations as trustee and holds adversely, a 
beneficiary with knowledge of the repudiation 
can no longer rely upon the trustee's con-
tinued performance of his duty* The benefi-
ciary is then in a position similar to that 
of any other party who has an equitable claim 
against an adversary and may become barred by 
laches if he fails to proceed with reasonable 
diligence." Chandler v. Lally, 31 N.E.2d 1, 
(S.Jud.Ct. Mass. 1941). 
This case, decided under Massachusetts law with which plaintiffs 
and their attorney, Mr. Ciullo, should have been familiar, is 
dispositive of the case now before the court. The only excuse 
raised by Calvin W. Clayton, Sr. for his delay in bringing any 
action or for his action in revoking the Clayton Family Trust 
was his subserviency to his father and his belief that his father 
could do what he wanted because it was his property. (R.249, 250.) 
On the other hand, Calvin knew that the Clayton Family Trust was 
irrevocable because Mario Ciullo told him so (Ab.3 R.14) yet Calvin 
actively participated to revoke said trust. 
The time period during which a plaintiff has delayed in 
asserting his rights is to be measured from the date of the injury. 
Or as stated in 30A C.J.S., Equity, §116, p.59: 
"In ascertaining whether relief should be 
refused because of laches, lapse of time 
should generally be considered as running 
from the date when the alleged legal injury 
occurred." 
As stated in their Complaint, (R.442) and their Amended Complaint 
(R.551), the plaintiffs in this case allege to have been injured 
when, 
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"On or about June 9, 1967, C. Comstock Clayton 
in breach of his fiduciary duties and without 
the knowledge or consent of Calvin W. Clayton, 
Sr., the other trustee, or any of the bene-
ficiaries of the Clayton Family Trust did 
wrongfully and fraudulently withdraw and 
convert to his own use said 125 shares of 
Clayton-MacFarlane Company capital stock from 
the said Clayton Family Trust and had said 
shares of stock transferred and delivered to 
himself, individually, as C. Comstock Clayton." 
Thus, it would appear that the period of delay began on June 9, 
IS67 and ended when plaintiffs filed their complaint on December 
28, 1971. This four and one-half year delay evidences a disregard 
of plaintiffs' claimed right to assert a claim against C. Comstock 
Clayton for the alleged breach of trust and their responsibility 
to do so. 
The equitable doctrine of laches is not so strict as to 
disregard plaintiffs1 delay when it has been brought about by 
ignorance, incapacity or other excusable factors. 
Thus, it has been said that, "In order for laches to be 
a valid defense, it is held that the delay must be unexplained 
and inexcusable." 27 Am Jur 2d, Equity, §164, p.705. Plaintiff 
must have known or had the opportunity to find out about the 
alleged injury and to assert his rights with respect thereto, 
and then done nothing about it. See 27 Am Jur 2d, Equity, §167 
p.710. That this principal is applicable in Utah and with 
respect to beneficiaries who claim that their rights under a 
trust have been abused was made clear by this Court in Acott v. 
Tomlinson, 9 Utah 2d, 337 P.2d 720, 724 (1959), where it said: 
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"Contributory negligence or even stupidity on 
the part of the beneficiary of a trust in not 
discovering his rights are being abused is 
not a basis for the application of laches.... 
That defense is only available against a bene-
ficiary who knows, or the circumstances are 
such that he must be charged with knowledge of 
the trustee's breach, or of his repudiation of 
the trust, and who so long delays in bringing 
suit that it would be inequitable to hold the 
trustee." See also Walker v. Walker, 17 Utah 
2d 53, 404 P.2d 253 (1965); Child v. Child, 
8 Utah 2d 261, 332 P.2d 981 (1958); Berniker 
v. Berniker, 174 p.2d 668 (D.C. App. Cal. 1947); 
Davies v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 
63 P.2d 529 (Wash. 1937); McCallum v. Anderson, 
147 F.2d 811, (10th Cir. 1945); Restatement 2d, 
Trusts, §219, p.513. 
In spite of the assertion in plaintiffs1 Amended Complaint 
that C. Comstock Clayton transferred the 125 shares of Clayton-
Macfarlane Company stock without their knowledge, the record fails 
to support this Calvin W. Clayton, Sr. unequivocably stated on 
the witness stand that he signed the certificate of stock issued 
to the Clayton Family Trust in order to transfer it to the Clayton 
Beneficiary Voting Trust and that he executed the Voting Trust 
having full knowledge of its provisions and their affect on his 
interests. (Ab. 38 R. 239). And Mario Ciullo stated that he 
had advised Calvin that the Clayton Family Trust was irrevocable. 
(Ab. 3 R. 14) . There can be no doubt therefore that not only 
was Calvin aware of the repudiation of the Clayton Family Trust, 
of which he now complains, but he participated as a trustee in 
said repudiation in spite of the fact that his attorney had 
advised him that said trust was irrevocable. 
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Therefore, the conclusion which must be reached is 
that since Calvin knew of and participated in the revocation 
of the Clayton Family Trust, which he had been advised was 
illegal, he knew or was on notice to find out about such a 
repudiation and the time for him to assert his rights accrued 
when he knew that Comstock had signed or was prepared to sign 
the stock certificate and the Clayton Beneficiary Voting 
Trust, 
While the record appears to indicate that Calvinfs three 
sons as the other beneficiaries of the Clayton Family Trust had 
no clear knowledge at least until 1970 of its existence or the 
repudiation in favor of the Clayton Beneficiary Voting Trust, 
there is authority which suggests that Calvin's knowledge may 
be imputed to his children and that the time during which no 
action has been taken will apply to them as well. Thus, it is 
said: 
"It has been held on the one hand that where 
time has begun to run against the ancestor, 
it continues to run against the heir, although 
the latter is an infant or feme covert, ...." 
30 C.J.S., Equity, §12 8, p.75, 
"Since a party is generally charged with the 
laches of his privies...or agents, ...it follows 
that knowledge of an ancestor will be imputed 
to an heir, . . .. " Id., p. 86. 
This position is supported also by Rule 17(a), Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, which vests in the trustee of a trust any 
right of action for wrongs against trust property. In a recent 
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case in Idaho, Jones v. State, 432 P.2d 420, (S.Ct. Id. 1967), 
the Supreme Court of that state held that where the trustee 
of a trust involving a sale of real property in breach of trust 
failed to act within the time required under the statute of 
limitations, the minor beneficiaries of the trust were precluded 
by said statute of limitations from suit for their interests 
against those who purchased the property from those gaining title 
through adverse possession. 
In addition to a showing of a lapse of time, other factors 
are important in determining whether plaintiffs1 laches will 
preclude recovery. As indicated above, plaintiff's delay in 
asserting his rights must be excusable in order to allow him to 
escape application of the laches doctrine. However, only such 
factors as age, competency, or lack of knowledge have been 
allowed to show excusable neglect. In the case at issue here, 
Calvin W. Clayton, Sr., lacks any excuse for his laches. Obviously, 
his age and competency were adequate and as pointed out above, he 
not only had knowledge of his fatherfs repudiation of the Clayton 
Family Trust, but he was a willing participant in spite of legal 
advice that his action was illegal. And as indicated above, his 
actions may be imputed to his children. 30A C.J.S., Equity, 
§115, p.44 lists other factors to be considered in determining, 
in any particular case, whether there are laches: 
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"Other matters to be considered...include the 
duration of the delay in asserting the claim, the 
sufficiency of the excuse offered in extenuation 
of the delay, whether plaintiff acquiesced in the 
assertion or operation of the corresponding 
adverse claim, whether the evidence of the matters 
in dispute has been lost or become obscured, 
whether the conditions have so changed as to 
render the enforcement of the right inequitable, 
whether third persons have acquired intervening 
rights, the nature of the duty or obligation 
sought to be enforced, and whether plaintiff or 
defendant was in possession of the property in 
suit during the delay.!t 
The duration of the delay and the sufficiency of the excuse 
offered having already been considered, further discussion is not 
necessary except to say that upon showing evidence of said factors, 
any of several presumptions may arise in favor of defendant as 
described in 30A C.J.S., Equity, §116, p.60: 
"Long lapse of time, if unexplained, may create 
or justify a presumption against the existence or 
validity of plaintiff1s right and in favor of the 
adverse right of defendant; or a presumption that, 
if plaintiff was ever possessed of a right, it has 
been abandoned or waived, or has been in some manner 
satisfied; ...or a presumption that the evidence 
of the transaction in issue has been lost or become 
obscured, ...or a presumption that the adverse 
party would be prejudiced by the enforcement of 
plaintiff's claim." 
The question of "whether plaintiff acquiesced in the 
assertion or operation" of the Clayton Beneficiary Voting Trust 
is clearly answered by the claim made by all plaintiffs in their 
Complaint, Amended Complaint and Claim of Creditors filed with 
the Executor, Behle. In all of these documents, plaintiffs assert 
their rights to the stock in issue based upon the validity of the 
1967 Clayton Beneficiary Voting Trust. Thus, they accepted the 
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alleged breach of which they now complain and relied upon it to 
establish their rights under the 1967 trust. 
That this is a proper element to consider with respect 
to laches is made clear by the following: 
11
 Acquiesence in an adverse right is an important 
element of laches. Where plaintiff has acquiesced 
for an unreasonable length of time in the assertion 
of operation of a right adverse to his own, equity 
will not enforce his claim." 30A C.J.S., Equity/ 
§117, p.63. 
The death of C. Comstock Clayton in early 19 71 and the 
vague recollection of certain important events in the minds of 
parties and important witnesses underline another factor which must 
be weighed in the balance to determine whether plaintiffs should 
be precluded in their claim because of their laches. Thus, it has 
been said: 
"A court of equity may refuse relief after inexcusable 
delay because of the difficulty, if not the impossi-
bility, of arriving at a safe and certain conclusion 
as to the truth of the matters in controversy and 
doing justice between the parties, where the evidence 
has been lost or become obscured through the loss of 
documents, or through death or disappearance of one 
or more of the participants in the transaction in 
suit or of the witnesses thereto, or through impair-
ment of the memory of participants or witnesses still 
living." 3 0A C.J.S., Equity, §118, p.69. 
There can be no doubt that if C. Comstock Clayton were 
alive today any question respecting his intent or his understanding 
of the law concerning the trusts in question would be easily 
established. Further, any vagueness in the recollection of witnesses 
or parties as to their statements to C. Comstock Clayton or his 
intent would be clarified. However, with the death of Mr. Clayton, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
important testimony and guidance in gathering evidence and 
establishing a defense has been lost to the defendants. As the 
Supreme Court of Hawaii said: 
"In an action against a trustee for breach 
of trust, death of a material witness during 
the period that a beneficiary has delayed 
in bringing his action is an important cir-
cumstance to be considered in determining 
whether the beneficiary is guilty of laches." 
Brown v. Bishop Trust Company, 355 P.2d 179 
(1960). 
Another factor which must be considered is whether third 
persons have acquired intervening rights. If such is the case and 
if by enforcing the plaintiffs1 claim such rights would be injured, 
a court of equity will refuse to grant relief. As stated in 
30A C.J.S., Equity, §118, p.68: 
"A court of equity will refuse to act where, 
in the course of an inexcusable delay, third 
persons have acquired rights in the subject 
matter of the controversy which would be in-
juriously affected by the granting of relief." 
The style of this case indicates that Geraldine V. Griffiths is 
seeking recovery under the 19 67 Clayton Beneficiary Voting Trust 
and the trustee defendants represent a charitable foundation 
created by C. Comstock Clayton to support, among other things, 
the arts in Utah. Thus, Geraldine Griffiths as well as all people 
interested in the advancement of the arts in Utah have acquired 
intervening interests in the subject of this lawsuit which is the 
res of the Clayton Family Trust and all would be prejudiced through 
no fault of theirs by a finding which would allow plaintiffs to 
recover the stock in question. 
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Closely associated with the question of intervening rights 
is the question of "whether conditions have so changed as to render 
the enforcement of this right inequitable." That this consideration 
is important is indicated by language from 30A C.J.S., Equity, 
§118, p.65, where it is stated: 
"Injury or prejudice resulting from the granting 
of relief to the adverse party is an important 
element of laches; and where prejudicial changes 
in conditions have occurred during plaintiff's 
delay in asserting his right, it will be barred 
for laches." 
Obviously the arts in Utah in which Mr. Clayton was keenly interested 
will be advanced and aided by the use of the stock in question and 
enforcement of plaintiffs1 claim would be prejudicial to the recipients 
of Foundation aid. While this, in and of itself, is important to 
consider, an equcilly important consideration is that the entire 
estate plan of C. Comstock Clayton would be set aside by granting 
plaintiffs1 requested relief. 
In the first place, it is clear from the various documents 
in evidence and from the trial transcript that during his lifetime 
C. Comstock Clayton had in mind benefitting his only living child, 
Calvin, his grandsons, Bruce, Calvin and Charles, his granddaughter, 
Geraldine, Calvin's wife, Winifred, and the arts. Thus, while in 
the Clayton Family Trust he had provided only for Calvin arid his 
sons, in the Clayton Beneficiary Voting Trust, after Calvin and his 
wife, Winifred, were at odds, Comstock provided for Winifred 
separately and also included Geraldine who had been left out of 
the Family Trust. That his desire was to provide for these two 
beneficiaries is clear by his insistence that they be included in 
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the C. Comstock Clayton Trust which was drafted at approximately 
the same time as the Clayton Beneficiary Voting Trust. This 
insistence is pointed out by his letter to Mario Ciullo dated 
May 2 0, 1969 (Exhibit 10 below) in which he indicates his willing-
ness to execute the C. Comstock Clayton Trust if and when these 
two beneficiaries are added. 
The fact that Mr. Clayton was concerned and interested in 
the Arts in Utah appears not only from the fact that he set up 
the C. Comstock Clayton Foundation for this purpose, but also 
from the fact that he made said Foundation the residuary beneficiary 
under his Will in which he included as beneficiaries all of the 
plaintiffs herein as well as others. 
Another aspect of the change in conditions since the date 
of the Clayton Family Trust is the fact that all of the plaintiffs 
herein have been provided for through the C. Comstock Clayton 
Trust and the Will of Mr. Clayton in amounts equal to or in excess 
of that which they could claim as beneficiaries of the Clayton 
Family Trust. Thus, pursuant to the terms of the C. Comstock 
Clayton Trust (a Trust funded with a $360,000 subordinated loan), 
after the life estate of C. Comstock Clayton, Calvin W. Clayton, Sr., 
and Geraldine V. Robertson (now Griffiths) share a life estate. 
At the death of Calvin W. Clayton, Sr., his wife, Winifred, will 
receive his share for life and at the death of Calvin W. Clayton, 
Sr. and Winifred, their issue are to receive their share in per 
stirpes shares. At the death of Geraldine, her issue will receive 
her share in per stirpes shares. And under the terms of C. Comstock 
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Clayton's Last Will and Testament, the parties herein have received 
in cash or the equivalent thereof the following: 
Geraldine V. Robertson (now Griffiths) — All personal 
property plus $25,000 
Winifred U. Clayton -- $10,000 
Charles Comstock Clayton II — $25,000 
Bruce Underwood Clayton — $25,000 
Calvin Whitney Clayton — $25,000 
Calvin Whitney Clayton, Sr. — $80,614 
C. Comstock Clayton Foundation — residue 
These changes made by C. Comstock Clayton with respect to 
his estate planning, bringing into the picture his granddaughter 
and his daughter-in-law as well as the Clayton Foundation Trust, 
have so radically changed the conditions which prevailed in 196 3 
at the time the Clayton Family Trust was set up, that it would be 
grossly inequitable to enforce plaintiffs1 claims in derrogation 
of the clearly intended estate planning of Mr. Clayton. Such 
would result in unjust enrichment of these particular four plaintiffs, 
Calvin W. Clayton,.Sr. and his three sons, by allowing them to 
receive twice what C. Comstock Clayton obviously planned to give 
only once to them and would exclude the fourth grandchild, Geraldine, 
and Calvin W. Clayton, Sr.'s estranged wife, Winifred. And while 
this Court has found that it would be unfair to apply the doctrine 
of laches to deprive a plaintiff of the benefits of his planning, 
Child v. Child, supra., so it would be unfair to impress a trust 
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upon the stock in question here to deprive C. Comstock Clayton 
of his planning. As the Court said in Child, "He who plants 
the crop should reap the harvest;" or in this case, "He who 
earned the estate and directs its distribution should not be 
frustrated in his efforts without good reason." Again at the very 
least the court below should have denied any claim made by Calvin 
W. Clayton, Sr. since he knew of and participated in the repudiation 
of the Clayton Family Trust and yet waited four and one-half years 
and until his father was dead to complain of it. 
III. 
CALVIN CLAYTON, SR. AND HIS SONS SHOULD HAVE FILED 
A PROPER CLAIM WITH THE EXECUTOR UNDER THE 1963 
RANCH TRUST, AS THEY DID TOGETHER WITH THEIR 
MOTHER AND COUSIN UNDER THE 196 7 RANCH TRUST 
Section 75-9-4 is the legislators1 mandate in probate pro-
ceedings that "All claims arising upon contract, whether the same 
are due, not due or contingent, must be presented within the time 
limited in the notice, and any claim not presented is barred forever." 
Plaintiffs, all six of them, timely filed in 1971 such a 
claim with the Executor, seeking under the 19 67 contract with 
decedent creating the Clayton Beneficiary Voting Trust to obtain 
equitable relief by way of impressing a constructive trust on the 
Ranch stock. When in June the Executor under all the circumstances 
denied this claim and put plaintiffs to their proof, this suit 
under Section 75-9-9 was timely filed by all six in December of 
that year, including recitals of submission of the claim to the 
Executor, and its denial. Section 75-9-11 explicitly provides that 
"No holder of any claim against an estate shall maintain any action 
thereon unless the claim is first presented to the executor...." 
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In 1971 when the six plaintiffs filed their claim with 
the Executor and brought this suit/ Calvin Sr., unequivocally 
stated all along that he had read it "page by page" in 1963, and 
some of Calvin's sons and their attorney, Ciullo, knew of the 
1963 Trust. Together at that time they all six elected to make 
no claim under the 19 63 contract. Instead, together they elected 
to claim only under that of 1967. Not until April of 1973 when 
the facts developed that the 1967 Trust had never been "activated" 
or funded, did Calvin and his three sons bring out the new, but 
really old, claim arising out of the 196 3 contract with the 
Decedent. 
In the meantime, Executor had relied upon the filing of 
the claim arising out of the 196 7 contract. 
In the old case of Hamilton v. Pooley, 15 Utah 280, 49 P. 769 
(1897), this Court pointed out the difference between a creditor 
seeking to recover an ordinary debt against the estate, and one 
who is asserting an equitable claim or interest in property in the 
executor's hands. This rule may very well apply here, and plain-
tiffs may have needlessly filed the claim under the 19 67 contract 
under an erroneous impression, despite the statute, that such was 
a condition precedent to filing this action. 
An executor of course is under strict limitations as to 
claims, and the point here is that while this Court might very 
well determine the law to be that no claim had to be filed with 
the executor in this case, as the Court below held, still this 
emphasizes that plaintiffs coming to the bar of equity to seek 
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relief are not entitled to such relief under the 196 3 Trust 
when in 1971 they were all very well aware that the 19 63 Trust 
had been revoked in fact by their benefactor in lieu of other 
compensatory benefits which he had granted them and they had 
accepted in lieu of the 1963 Trust; and when Calvin Clayton, Sr., 
the co-trustee and Ciullo and Macfarlane, Mr. Clayton's attorneys, 
had actively participated in such revocation. And to the extent 
that the three sons understandably might not have known of the 
196 3 Ranch Trust as their father did, at the time of its creation, 
or of its revocation in 1967, by 1971 as adults they concurred in 
the revocation when they elected to claim only under the 1967 Ranch 
Trust and also accepted under the 1967 Charles Comstock Clayton 
Trust, as well as the Will. 
It should be noted that Winifred would not participate 
in such conniving, for when she learned that the 1967 Ranch 
Trust apparently had never been activated, and that in lieu of 
the old 19 67 trust her father-in-law had set up both the Will 
and the Charles Comstock Clayton Trust in which she would parti-
cipate, she would not further participate in an action to frustrate 
her benefactor's intent. 
Not only is Decedent's clear intent frustrated by the decision 
below and the claims still made for equitable relief in this Court, 
but the Estate and Foundation which he left have been badly im-
paired by the consequences of the revival of the revoked 196 3 
trust, which plaintiffs had helped, and knew had been, revoked, 
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IV. 
PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO MEET AND 
CARRY THEIR BURDEN OF ESTABLISHING 
THE VALIDITY OF THE CLAYTON FAMILY 
TRUST BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE 
Normally, in civil actions, the burden of proof in a 
matter rests upon the party who asserts the affirmative of an 
issue. Thus, it has been said: 
"The burden of proof in the strict sense of the 
term, that is, the ultimate burden of establish-
ing the truth of a given proposition of fact 
essential to a cause of action or defense, rests 
upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings 
or the nature of the case, asserts the affirmative 
of the issue, . . . .If 29 AmJur2d, Evidence, §127, 
p.159. 
This burden is the same in equity as at law. Or as stated in 
30A C.J.S., Equity, §477, p.497: 
"There is no difference with respect to the burden 
of proof between proceedings at law and in equity; 
in both, the party maintaining the affirmative 
of the issue has it cast on him. The burden is 
on the complainant to establish the truth of the 
material and controverted allegations on which 
he bases his right to relief, not withstanding 
the fact that the bill waives an answer under oath." 
And, particularly with respect to trusts, the burden is 
upon he who would establish a trust to prove by clear and convincing 
evidence that such a trust exists and is valid. Or as the Supreme 
Court of Montana has said: 
"The burden of proof to establish the existence 
of a trust...is upon the party who claims it. 
Trusts must be founded on evidence which is un-
mistakable, clear, satisfactory and convincing." 
First National Bank of Twin Bridges v. Sant, 161 
Mont. 376, 506 P.2d 835, 841 (1973). 
_ on 
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It is clear from the record in the action before this 
Court that plaintiffs have failed to meet and carry their burden. 
The reliance in their Complaint and Amended Complaint upon both 
the 1963 and 1967 Trusts casts the first shadow of ambiguity over 
their proof. This shadow was compounded when the light of truth 
became obscured by the death of C. Comstock Clayton, the only 
competent witness to speak of the matters here in question. The 
apparent changes in Comstock Clayton's estate planning could only 
be verified by his own testimony. The vague recollections of 
happenings in 1963 and 1967 by the witnesses before the court add 
to the shadows. And finally the entire matter is blackened by the 
apparent dealings of one of the principal beneficiaries of the 
trusts in question and the Massachusetts attorney who drafted all 
of the trust instruments before the Court and who failed to give 
clear advice as to their effect. 
So, far from being clear and convincing, the evidence 
adduced by the plaintiffs is rendered unclear by all of the 
testimony and exhibits produced by plaintiffs. The lack of clarity 
thus produced certainly falls short of what might be called 
"convincing" evidence. 
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V, 
IN ALL REMAINING ASPECTS OF THIS APPEAL, THE 
EXECUTOR ADOPTS THE POINTS AND ARGUMENTS OF 
THE APPELLANT FOUNDATION IN THIS PLEA BEFORE 
EQUITY TO UPSET AT THE BEHEST OF DECEDENT'S 
MASSACHUSETTS FAMILY THE TRUST FOR THE BENEFIT 
OF THE PEOPLE OF UTAH WHICH MR. CLAYTON SO UN-
EQUIVOCALLY DESIRED TO IMPLEMENT. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant Executor adopts the argument of Appellants 
Trustees that the 196 3 Clayton Family Trust was properly revoked 
by C. Comstock Clayton. While this, in and of itself, should 
have been enough to preclude plaintiffs from the recovery allowed 
by the lower court, the conclusion is inescapable that the equities 
of this case must bar the plaintiffs from said recovery. Since 
Equity will not countenance wrongdoing or aid a wrongdoer in ob-
taining the benefit of his wrongful acts, the court below clearly 
erred when, in spite of clear indications of the illegal and un-
conscionable conduct of beneficiaries and others closely associated 
with the trust in question, it permitted the distortion and destruc-
tion of C. Comstock Claytonfs estate planning by the unjust 
enrichment of beneficiaries for whom he had otherwise provided. 
DATED this day of November, 1976. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JAMES B. LEE 
JOSEPH W. ANDERSON 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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EXHIBIT A 
TABLE OF KEY DATES AND EVENTS 
10/22/63 
5/16/67 
6/9/67 
7/12/67 
7/18/67 
7/20/67 
8/29/67 
6/1/68 
9/1/68 
2/5/69 
5/20/69 
9/17/69 
10/7-13/69 
12/7/70 
Dec. 1970 
12/30/70 
12/31/70 
2/14/71 
June 1971 
12/23/71 
Apr. 1973 
Clayton Family Trust (CFT) executed, and funded 
(Stock Certificate No. 26). 
Stock power to terminate CFT executed by C. 
Comstock Clayton (CCC) and Calvin W. Clayton. 
Stock Certificate No. 26 transferred from CFT 
to CCC personally (Stock Certificate No. 39). 
Clayton Beneficiary Voting Trust (CBVT) counter-
parts sent to CCC by Ciullo. 
CCC executed C. Comstock Clayton Trust (CCCT). 
CCC transferred Stock Certificate No. 39 to 
CBVT (Stock Certificate No. 40) delivered to him. 
CCC acknowledged CBVT before Macfarlane. 
C. Comstock Clayton Foundation (CCC Foundation) 
established and funded. 
Last Will and Testament executed by CCC. 
CCC transferred Stock Certificate No. 40 from 
CBVT back to himself (Stock Certificate No. 41)• 
CCC letter to Ciullo about redrafting and funding 
CCC Trust. 
CCC transferred 10 0 shares of Stock Certificate No. 41 
to CCC Foundation (Stock Certificate No. 43). 
CCC Trust as redrafted was executed by CCC and Ciullo, 
co-trustees. 
Ciullo phoned Macfarlane and Behle advising that the 
Ranch Stock was supposed to be in a Massachusetts Trust, 
CCC Trust funded. 
CCC advised Behle that Massachusetts Trust had 
never been activated 
Codicil to Last Will executed. 
Charles Comstock Clayton died. 
Claim filed with Executor under 1967 CBVT and denied. 
Suit brought by the six beneficiaries of 1967 CBVT 
Amended Complaint filed alternatively claiming under 
1963 CFT. 
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EXHIBIT B 
TABLE OF CLAYTON - MACFARLANE SHARES HISTORY 
NAME OF OWNER 
CLAYTON FAMILY TRUST 
C. COMSTOCK CLAYTON 
(Individual) 
BENEFICIARY VOTING 
TRUST 
C- COMSTOCK CLAYTON 
(Individual) 
C. COMSTOCK CLAYTON 
FOUNDATION 
C. COMSTOCK CLAYTON 
(Individual) 
DATE OF EXECUTION 
OF TRUSTS 
October 22, 1963 
July 20, 1967 
STOCK CERTIFICATE NO. 
No. 26 
(125 shares) 
No. 39 
(125 shares) 
No. 40 
(125 shares) 
No. 41 
(125 shares) 
No. 43 
(100 shares) 
No. 42 
(25 shares) 
DATE OF ISSUANCE 
OF CERTIFICATE 
November 1, 1963 
June 9, 1967 
July 20, 1967 
Feb, 5, 1969 
Sept. 17, 1969 
Sept. 17, 1969 
DATE OF CANCEL-
LATION 
June 9, 1967 
July 20, 1967 
February 5, 1969 
Sept. 17, 1969 
Delivered to 
Trustees 
In Decedent's 
Estate Assets 
NEW OWNER and 
CERTIFICATE NO. 
C. Comstock Claytor 
Certificate No. 39 
Beneficiary Voting 
Trust - Certificate 
No. 40 
C. Comstock Clayton 
Certificate No. 41 
25 shares/C. Comsto 
Clay ton, Cer t. No. 
and Clayton Foundat 
100 shares - Certif: 
No. 44 
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